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In this supplement, we discuss budget balance and surplus extraction in dy-
namic mechanisms with interdependent valuations. We also study efficient dy-
namic mechanisms when agents’ signals evolve independently. Finally, we pro-
vide proofs that are omitted in the main paper.
S1. Budget-balanced mechanisms
We first consider budget-balanced mechanisms when the time horizon is infinite (T =
∞).1 The mechanism = (tatpt)Tt=1 is ex ante budget balanced if
E
[
T∑
t=1
δt−1
N∑
i=1
pit
]
≥ 0
The mechanism is budget balanced if for each t,
E
[
N∑
i=1
pit
]
= 0
The mechanism is ex post budget balanced if for each t,
N∑
i=1
pit ≡ 0
These notions are related to the mechanism designer’s financing abilities. When the de-
signer has access to long-term outside financing, an ex ante balanced budget means that
the expected present value of all transfers from agents is nonnegative. If the financing
ability is limited, the relevant notion is budget balance, which says that in each period
the designer breaks even on average. Without any outside financing, ex post budget bal-
ance requires that agents’ transfers sum to zero in each period for any realized signal
profile.
Heng Liu: hengliu29@gmail.com
1For the finite-horizon case, the same approach adopted in this subsection yields a balanced budget in
all but the last period.
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As we mentioned in the paper, one problem with the constructed efficient dynamic
mechanisms is that they run large deficits subsidizing agents in each period. Budget
balance requires these subsidies to be financed by the participants. An important in-
sight from Athey and Segal (2013) is that the problem of contingent deviations needs
to be carefully addressed when signals are persistent, since transfers in each period are
calculated based on the conditional distribution of signals in order to balance the bud-
get. However, the conditional distributions are manipulable by agents through their
previous reported signals. The balanced team mechanism proposed by Athey and Segal
(2013) is not applicable in our settings with interdependent valuations and information
correlation.
We first show that ex ante budget-balanced mechanisms can be constructed by in-
troducing participation fees to the original efficient dynamic mechanism in the first pe-
riod. After observing the first period’s signal θi1, each agent i pays a proportion of the
expected discounted sum of other agents’ total subsidies, an amount that is indepen-
dent of her current signal θi1. In expectation, the total amount of participation fees
is equal to the total amount of future subsidies. Specifically, let {pit} denote the trans-
fers in the efficient dynamic mechanism constructed in Theorem 3.1 in the paper. Note
that for each i, pi1 ≡ 0. For each θ1 ∈ 1, every agent’s equilibrium payoff in the effi-
cient mechanism is W (θ1). So the expected discounted sum of subsidies for agent i
is
E
[∑
t≥1
δt−1pit
]
= E
[
W (θ1)−
∑
t≥1
δt−1ui
(
a∗t (θt) θt
)]

where the expectation is over the entire sequence of signal profiles. For each i and θi1,
define
ηi
(
θi1
)
−E
[∑
t≥1
δt−1pit
∣∣∣θi1
]
= −E
[
W (θ1)−
∑
t≥1
δt−1ui
(
a∗t (θt) θt
)∣∣∣θi1
]

Then for each agent i, consider the transfers {p˜it} defined as
p˜i1(θ1)=
1
N − 1
∑
j =i
ηj
(
θ
j
1
)

and p˜it = pit for t ≥ 2. Note that p˜i1 is independent of agent i’s report, so {p˜it} is also pe-
riodic ex post incentive compatible. Moreover, by the law of iterated expectations, the
expected sum of transfers satisfies
E
[
N∑
i=1
∑
t≥1
δt−1p˜it
]
= E
[
N∑
i=1
p˜i1 +
N∑
i=1
∑
t≥2
δt−1p˜it
]
= E
[
N∑
i=1
(
ηi
(
θi1
)+∑
t≥1
δt−1pit
)]
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=
N∑
i=1
E
[
−E
[∑
t≥1
δt−1pit
∣∣∣θi1
]
+
∑
t≥1
δt−1pit
]
= 0
Suppose next that the designer has limited instruments for intertemporal financ-
ing. We now construct a budget-balanced mechanism under which the expected sum of
transfers in each period is zero. For each i, t, at , and θt , define
ξi(at θt) ui(at θt)− 1
N
N∑
j=1
uj(at θt)
to be the deviation of agent i’s flow utility from the average flow utility. Since ξi(at θt)
is bounded, by the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1, if Assumption 2 holds, there
exist transfers pˆit+1 : −it+1 × it × At × −it → R such that for each at and θ−it and each
pair (θit r
i
t ), we have
ξi(at θt)= δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
pˆit+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;at θ−it
)
μt+1(θt+1|at θt)
≤ δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
pˆit+1
(
θ−it+1 r
i
t ;at θ−it
)
μt+1(θt+1|at θt)
Set pˆi1 ≡ 0 for each i and consider the dynamic mechanism {a∗t  pˆt}. The expected
sum of transfers in period t + 1 under the truthful strategies is
∑
θt+1∈t+1
N∑
i=1
pˆit+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;a∗t (θt) θ−it
)
μ
(
θt+1|a∗t (θt) θt
)= N∑
i=1
ξi
(
a∗t (θt) θt
)= 0
Moreover, if Assumption 3 holds, then similar to the logic in Theorem 3.2, there are
transfers p˜it+1 :−it+1 ×At ×−it →R such that for each at and θt , we have
ξi(at θt)= δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
p˜it+1
(
θ−it+1;at θ−it
)
μt+1(θt+1|at θt)
and, hence, a balanced budget
∑
θt+1∈t+1
N∑
i=1
p˜it+1
(
θ−it+1;a∗t (θt) θ−it
)
μt+1
(
θt+1|a∗t (θt) θt
)= 0
Therefore, we only need to show that either {pˆt} or {p˜t} achieves incentive compatibility.
The result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition S1.1. Suppose T = ∞. Under either Assumption 2 or 3, there exists an
efficient dynamic mechanism that is periodic ex post incentive compatible and balances
the budget in the truthful equilibrium.
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Note that the above transfers, {pˆt} and {p˜t}, only balance the budget on the equi-
librium path. More assumptions on the joint distributions of signals are needed for ex
post budget balance along the lines of the analysis in Kosenok and Severinov (2008) and
Hörner et al. (2015). Since this question is beyond the scope of the current paper, we
leave it for future research.
S2. Efficient mechanisms without correlation
If the correlation conditions are violated, the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.1
and Theorem 3.2 may not work for some utility functions. In this section, we drop the
assumption that signal spaces are finite but restrict our attention to one-dimensional
environments and the evolution of private information is independent across agents.
We construct a transfer schedule that extends the generalized VCG mechanism to dy-
namic settings.
We say that a transfer {pt}Tt=1 or a mechanism {a∗t pt}Tt=1 is history-independent if for
each t and θt , and for any two public histories ht and h′t ,
pt(ht θt)= pt
(
h′t  θt
)

That is, a history-independent transfer pt depends only on the reported profile rt ∈ t
in period t. Under a history-independent mechanism, agent i’s period-t continuation
payoff depends only on her private signal θit , i.e.,
V it
(
θit
)= max
rit∈it
E
[
ui
(
a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)−pit(rit  θ−it )+ δV it+1(θit+1)]
In this case, we also define V it (at θt) as
V it (at θt)= ui(at θt)+ δE
[
V it+1
(
θit+1
)|at θt]
Assumption 5 (One-dimensional private signals). For each i and each t, it = [01].
Under Assumption 5, we can generalize the monotonicity condition in the static
model studied by Bergemann and Välimäki (2002). To save notation, assume that for
each t, At =A≡ {a1     aK}. For any i, t, and θ−it , define the set ikt ⊂it as
ikt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
θit ∈it
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
ui
(
akθt
)+ δE[Wt+1(θt+1)|akθt]
≥
∑
i
ui
(
al θt
)+ δE[Wt+1(θt+1)|al θt]∀a
l = ak
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭

We say that the collections of sets {ikt }Kk=1 satisfies monotonicity if for each k, θit θ˜it ∈
ikt implies that for each λ ∈ [01], λθit + (1−λ)θ˜it ∈ikt . Under monotonicity, there ex-
ists an efficient allocation a∗t in period t such that after relabeling the social alternatives,
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it can be partitioned into successive intervals {Si1t      SiKt } and each ak is chosen if
and only if θit ∈ Sikt . Then for each i, t, and θ−it , there is a linear order ≺it (which also
depends on θ−it ) on A:
a1 ≺it · · · ≺it aK
Assumption 6 (Independent transitions). For t = 1, μ1 = ∏Ni=1μi1, where, for each i,
μi1 ∈ (i1). For each t > 1, μt(θt |at−1 θt−1) =
∏N
i=1μit(θit |at−1 θit−1), where, for each i,
μit :A×it−1 → (it) is a transition probability.
Suppose a∗t (θt)= ak. Then consider the history-independent transfer
pit
∗
(θt)=
k∑
κ=1
∑
j =i
[
uj
(
aκ−1xit
(
κθ−it
)
 θ−it
)− uj(aκxit(κθ−it ) θ−it )]
+
k∑
κ=1
δE
[
Wt+1(θt+1)− V it+1(θt+1)|aκ−1xit
(
κθ−it
)
 θ−it
]
−
k∑
κ=1
δE
[
Wt+1(θt+1)− V it+1(θt+1)|aκxit
(
κθ−it
)
 θ−it
]

(S1)
where xit(κθ
−i
t )  inf{θit : a∗t (θit  θ−it ) = aκ}. Note that pit∗(θt) does not depend directly
on θit under Assumption 6.
Finally, recall that Wt(θt) is the continuation social surplus given period-t signal pro-
file θt . For each at and θt , define Wt(at θt) as
Wt(at θt)=
N∑
i=1
ui(at θt)+ δE
[
Wt+1(θt+1)|at θt
]

The next theorem shows that the transfer constructed in (S1) is periodic ex post in-
centive compatible under some restrictions on the primitives. Therefore, it extends of
the generalized VCG mechanism to dynamic environments with interdependent valua-
tions.
Proposition S2.1. Suppose that Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. There exists a periodic ex
post incentive compatible mechanism {a∗t pt} with history-independent transfers if for
each t, i, and θ−it , there exists an order on the allocation spaceA such that
(i) Wt(at θit θ
−i
t ) is single-crossing in (at θ
i
t),
(ii) V it (at θ
i
t θ
−i
t ) has increasing difference in (at θ
i
t).
Remark S2.2. The transfer schedule (S1) can also be viewed as a generalization of the
dynamic pivot mechanism constructed by Bergemann and Välimäki (2010). To see this,
suppose that each utility function ui does not depend on θ−it and that private informa-
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tion is statistically independent across agents. Then (S1) can be written as
pit
∗
(θt)=
∑
j =i
[
uj
(
a∗t
(
θi θ−i
)
 θ−it
)− uj(a∗t (θt) θ−it )]
+ δE[W −i(θt+1)|a∗t (θi θ−i) θt]− δE[W −i(θt+1)|a∗t (θt) θt]
where
W −i(θt)=W (θt)− V i(θt)= max{as}s≥t E
[∑
s≥t
δs−t
(
ui
(
asθ
i
)+∑
j =i
uj
(
asθ
j
s
))]

Therefore each agent i’s transfer pit
∗
in every period t is the flow externality cost that she
imposes on other agents.
S3. Surplus extraction
In this section, we consider the problem of full surplus extraction in the infinite-horizon
(T = ∞) case. We assume that each agent’s utility function is nonnegative and normal-
ize each agent’s outside option from any period onward to zero. To simplify notations,
we also assume that the transition probabilities are stationary, i.e., for each t, t =t+1,
At+1 = At , and μt+1(θt+1|at θt) = μ(θt+1|at θt). We will show that the designer can al-
ways extract all the expected surplus from the agents by exploiting the intertemporal
correlation of private information. We also emphasize that intertemporal correlation
plays the same key role in surplus extraction as it does in efficient mechanisms. In con-
trast, the attempt to generalize Crémer and McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992)
based on correlation of intraperiod signals fails due to the possibility of belief manipu-
lations by agents.
Formally, we say that a dynamic mechanism {atpt} achieves full surplus extraction
if
E
[
W (θ1)−
N∑
i=1
∞∑
t=1
δt−1pit
]
= 0
That is, the expected discounted total transfer collected by the designer is equal to the
expected maximal social surplus. The following result shows that a simple modification
of the efficient dynamic mechanism in Theorem 3.1 ensures full surplus extraction and
agents’ participation constraints in the first period.
Proposition S3.1. Suppose T = ∞. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 (or Assumptions 1 and
3), there exists a periodic ex post incentive compatible dynamic mechanism that achieves
full surplus extraction.
In effect, the dynamic surplus extraction mechanism in Proposition S3.1 asks each
agent to pay a fixed and bounded participation fee and choose from a collection of lot-
teries in each period, followed by announcing her current signal as in the efficient dy-
namic mechanism in Theorem 3.1. The outcome of each lottery is revealed in the next
period, depending on other agents’ reports in both periods. All lotteries pay bonuses
to the agent, thereby ensuring that agents participate in the mechanism in each period.
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The upfront participation fees, which can be thought of as prices of entering any such
lotteries, serve to extract the surplus from agents.
Remark S3.2. Another notion of surplus extraction would require that the designer
obtains the entire continuation social surplus after each history. While in our mecha-
nism each agent collects zero expected surplus from the beginning of her interactions,
her continuation payoff after any nontrivial history is, in fact, positive as she obtains
bonuses from the lottery purchased in the previous round. Thus, the mechanism does
not satisfy this stronger version of surplus extraction. We conjecture that given agents’
interim participation constraints in each period, it is impossible to achieve surplus ex-
traction after each history.
S4. Proofs of results in Appendix A
Proof of Proposition S1.1. Since budget balance under either {pˆt} or {p˜t} is es-
tablished in the main text, we only need to show that both mechanisms, {a∗t  pˆt} and
{a∗t  p˜t}, are periodic ex post incentive compatible. By the one-shot deviation principle,
it suffices to prove that truth-telling is incentive compatible for agent i in period t after
any history if all agents report truthfully from period t + 1 onward. Here we prove the
result for {a∗t  p˜t}. The proof for {a∗t  pˆt} is similar and, hence, is omitted.
Fix any ht = {ht−1 θt−1 at−1}. We need to show that for each i and θ, rit = θit is a
solution to the maximization problem
max
rit
{
ui
(
a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)− p˜it(θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1)
+ δ
∑
θt+1
[
1
N
W (θt+1)− p˜it+1
(
θ−it+1;a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θ−it
)]
μt+1
(
θt+1|a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)}

(S2)
By construction, we have
δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
p˜it+1
(
θ−it+1;a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θ−it
)
μt+1
(
θt+1|a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)
= ui(a∗t (rit  θ−it ) θt)− 1N
N∑
i=1
ui
(
a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)

So the problem (S2) is equivalent to
max
rit
{
ui
(
a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)− p˜it(θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1)− ui(a∗t (rit  θ−it ) θt)
+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
ui
(
a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)
+ δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
1
N
W (θt+1)μt+1
(
θt+1|a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)}

(S3)
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Since the second term in the objective function of (S3), p˜it(θ
−i
t ;at−1 θ−it−1), is indepen-
dent of rit , solutions to problem (S3) are also solutions to the problem
max
rit
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
ui
(
a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)+ δ ∑
θt+1∈t+1
1
N
W (θt+1)μt+1
(
θt+1|a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)}

The result then follows from the definition of a∗t . 
Proof of Proposition S2.1. The proof is by backward induction on t. For each t,
the argument follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3 in Bergemann and
Välimäki (2002, pp. 1029–1030) with the transfers defined in (S1). 
Proof of Proposition S3.1. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1. For each t
and i, agent i’s current signal θit is correlated with other agents’ signals θ
−i
t+1 in the next
period as in Assumption 2, and there exists a function q˜it+1 : −it+1 ×it ×At ×−it → R
such that for each at and θ
−i
t and each pair (θ
i
t r
i
t ),
ui(at θt)= δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
q˜it+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;at θ−it
)
μ(θt+1|at θt)
≤ δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
q˜it+1
(
θ−it+1 r
i
t ;at θ−it
)
μ(θt+1|at θt)
By the stationarity assumption, we have q˜it+1 = q˜it for each t ≥ 2. For each at , θ−it , let
Ki(at θ
−i
t ) ∈R be an upper bound of |q˜it+1|, i.e.,
Ki
(
at θ
−i
t
)
> sup
θ−it+1θ
i
t
∣∣q˜it+1(θ−it+1 θit;at θ−it )∣∣
Let Ki = maxat θ−it K
i(at θ
−i
t ). We also set q˜
i
1 ≡ 0 for all i. Note that the dynamic mecha-
nism {a∗t  q˜t} is well defined.
We first show that {a∗t  q˜t} is periodic ex post incentive compatible. Again assume all
agents other than agent i report truthfully. If agent i reports truthfully in period t, i.e.,
rit = θit , her continuation payoff is
ui
(
a∗t (θt) θt
)− q˜it(θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1)
− δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
q˜it+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;a∗t (θt) θ−it
)
μ
(
θt+1|a∗t (θt) θt
)
= −q˜it
(
θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1
)

Suppose agent i deviates to a message rit such that a
∗
t (r
i
t  θ
−i
t ) = a∗t (θt). Then her
continuation payoff satisfies
ui
(
a∗t (θt) θt
)− q˜it(θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1)
− δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
q˜it+1
(
θ−it+1 r
i
t ;a∗t (θt) θ−it
)
μ
(
θt+1|a∗t (θt) θt
)
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≤ ui(a∗t (θt) θt)− q˜it(θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1)
− δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
q˜it+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;a∗t (θt) θ−it
)
μ
(
θt+1|a∗t (θt) θt
)
= −q˜it
(
θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1
)

Suppose agent i deviates to a message rit such that a
∗
t (r
i
t  θ
−i
t )= a′ = a∗t (θt). Then her
continuation payoff satisfies
ui
(
a′ θt
)− q˜it(θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1)
− δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
q˜it+1
(
θ−it+1 r
i
t ;a′ θ−it
)
μ
(
θt+1|a′ θt
)
≤ ui(a′ θt)− q˜it(θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1)
− δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
q˜it+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;a′ θ−it
)
μ
(
θt+1|a′ θt
)
= −q˜it
(
θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1
)

Thus, after any history ht , truth-telling is optimal for agent i provided that other agents
also report their signals truthfully. The transfers q˜it+1 can be viewed as lottery payments
in period t+1 that agent i commits to fulfill in period t. Since each agent in every period
on average pays her flow utility in the previous period, it is straightforward to verify that
the designer extracts all surplus with the mechanism {a∗t  q˜t}.
Although agent i’s participation constraint in period 1 is satisfied under the mecha-
nism {a∗t  q˜t} as we have q˜i1 ≡ 0, her participation constraints in any subsequent period
could be violated. To see this, note that the above reasoning also shows that agent i’s
equilibrium continuation payoff after history ht is −q˜it(θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1), which may
be less attractive than her outside option from period t onward.
This problem can be resolved by replacing the transfers q˜it+1 in period t + 1 with an
upfront charge in period t and lottery bonuses in period t + 1. Recall that for each at
and θ−it , Ki(at θ−it ) is an upper bound of qit+1(· ·;at θ−it ). For each t and i, define a new
transfer function qˆit+1 :−it+1 ×it ×At ×−it →R by
qˆit+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;at θ−it
)≡ q˜it+1(θ−it+1 θit;at θ−it )−Ki(at θ−it )
Also define qˆi1 ≡ 0. Note that by construction, qit+1 ≤ 0 for each t and i. Thus, qˆit+1 can be
viewed as lottery bonuses for agent i. Set cit(at θ
−i
t )= δKi(at θ−it ) to be the entrance fee
or “price” of the lottery {qˆit+1} that agent i pays in period t.
Finally, for each agent i, define a sequence of transfers pˆit as follows: (a) in the first
period, agent i pays an entrance fee pˆi1(θ1)= ci1(a∗1(θi1 θ−i1 )θ−i1 ); (b) in each subsequent
periods, agent i collects the lottery bonus and pays another entrance fee, i.e., ∀t ≥ 1,
pˆit+1(ht θt+1)= qˆit+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;at θ−it
)+ cit+1(a∗t+1(θit+1 θ−it+1) θ−it+1)
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Under the mechanism {a∗t  pˆt}, after any history ht , agent i’s continuation payoff from
truth-telling is well defined and is given by
ui
(
a∗t (θt) θt
)− pˆit(ht θt)
− δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
qˆit+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;a∗t (θt) θ−it
)
μ
(
θt+1|a∗t (θt) θt
)
− lim
T→∞
δT−t+1E
[
Ki
(
a∗T (θT )θ
−i
T
)|a∗t (θt) θt]
= ui(a∗t (θt) θt)− pˆit(ht θt)
− δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
qˆit+1
(
θ−it+1 θ
i
t;a∗t (θt) θ−it
)
μ
(
θt+1|a∗t (θt) θt
)
= −qˆit
(
θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1
)≥ 0
Alternatively, agent i’s continuation payoff from lying in period t is no greater than
−qˆit(θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θit−1). Since the expected discounted sum of transfers satisfies
E
[∑
t
δt−1pˆit
]
= E
[∑
t
δt−1q˜it
]

it follows that the mechanism {a∗t  pˆt} is periodic ex post incentive compatible and
achieves full surplus extraction. 
S5. Proofs omitted in the paper
In this section, we first prove Lemma A.2 in the paper and then complete the proofs of
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 in the paper.
Proof of Lemma A.2. The proof follows directly from the following lemma.
Let S and T be finite sets. For each t ∈ T , let μ(·|t) ∈ (S) be a probability distribution
over S.
Lemma S5.1. Suppose for each t ∈ T , we have
dist2
(
μ(·|t)−Conv{μ(·|t ′)}
t ′ =t
)≥ 
for some  > 0. Then for any function u : T →R, there exists a function p : S×T →R such
that for any t and t ′,
u(t)=
∑
s∈S
p(s t)μ(s|t)≤
∑
s∈S
p
(
s t ′
)
μ(s|t)
and
max
st
∣∣p(s t)∣∣≤ (1+ 4

)
·max
t
∣∣u(t)∣∣
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Proof. For each t, let ν(·|t) ≡ (ν(s|t))s∈S = minν˜(·|t)∈Conv{μ(·|t′)}t′ =t ‖μ(·|t)− ν˜(·|t)‖2.2 De-
fine
d(s t)≡ μ(s|t)− ν(s|t)‖μ(·|t)− ν(·|t)‖2 
Note that ‖d(· t)‖2 = 1. By construction, for any t and t ′, we have∑
s′∈S
d
(
s′ t
)(
μ
(
s′|t ′)− ν(s′|t))≤ 0
and ∑
s′∈S
d
(
s′ t
)(
μ
(
s′|t)− ν(s′|t))= ∥∥μ(·|t)− ν(·|t)∥∥2 ≥ 
Define
e(s t)≡
∑
s′∈S
d
(
s′ t
)
μ
(
s′|t)− d(s t)
Then for any t and t ′, we have∑
s′∈S
e
(
s′ t
)
μ
(
s′|t)= 0< ≤∑
s′∈S
e
(
s′ t
)
μ
(
s′|t ′)
Define
p(s t)≡ u(t)+ c · e(s t)
where c = 2maxt |u(t)|/. Then for any t and t ′, we have
u(t)=
∑
s∈S
p(s t)μ(s|t)
and ∑
s∈S
p
(
s t ′
)
μ(s|t)= u(t ′)+ c∑
s∈S
e
(
s t ′
)
μ(s|t)≥ u′(t)+ c≥ u(t)
Finally, since maxs |e(s t)| ≤ ‖e(· t)‖2 ≤ 2, we have
max
s
p(s t)≤ ∣∣u(t)∣∣+ 2c
which implies that
max
st
∣∣p(s t)∣∣≤ (1+ 4

)
·max
t
∣∣u(t)∣∣ 
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (Finite horizon). Let Wt(θt) denote the expected period-t
continuation social surplus given signal profile θt , i.e.,
Wt(θt)= E
[
T∑
s=t
δs−t
N∑
i=1
ui
(
a∗t (θt) θt
)∣∣∣θt
]

2The term ‖ · ‖2 is the Euclidean norm.
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First consider the problem in period T . By Assumption 4, there exists an ex post
incentive compatible transfer pT :T →RN that implements the efficient allocation a∗T .
Given (a∗T pT ), the payoff V
i
T for each agent i in the truth-telling equilibrium is given by
V iT (θT )= ui
(
a∗T (θT )θT
)−piT (θT )
for each θT .
Next consider agent i’s incentive problem in period T − 1 with an arbitrary pub-
lic history hT−1 = (r1 a1 r2 a2     rt−1 at−1). Suppose that agents other than i always
report truthfully. For each pair (aT−1 θT−1), define
πiT−1(aT−1 θT−1)=
∑
j =i
uj(aT−1 θT−1)+ δE
[
W (θT )− V iT (θT )|aT−1 θT−1
]

By Lemma A.1 in the paper, there exists a function p˜iT (θ
−i
T  θ
i
T−1;aT−1 θ−iT−1) such that
for every aT−1, θ−iT−1, θ
i
T−1, and r
i
T−1, we have
πiT−1(aT−1 θT−1)= δ
∑
θT∈T
p˜iT
(
θ−iT  θ
i
T−1;aT−1 θ−iT−1
)
μT (θT |aT−1 θT−1)
and ∑
θT∈T
p˜iT
(
θ−iT  r
i
T−1;aT−1 θ−iT−1
)
μT (θT |aT−1 θT−1)
≤
∑
θT∈T
p˜iT
(
θ−iT  θ
i
T−1;aT−1 θ−iT−1
)
μT (θT |aT−1 θT−1)
Define a new period-T transfer p¯iT :−iT−1 ×iT−1 ×AT−1 ×T →R for agent i as
p¯iT
(
θ−iT−1 θ
i
T−1;aT−1 θT
)= piT (θT )− p˜iT (θ−iT  θiT−1;aT−1 θ−iT−1)
Note that p˜iT is independent of θ
i
T , so agent i still finds it optimal to report truthfully in
period T under this new transfer p¯iT . By construction, given that other agents always
report truthfully, it follows that for every realized signal θiT−1, it is optimal for agent i to
report riT−1 = θiT−1. Also note that for every signal profile θT−1, agent i’s continuation
payoff V iT−1 in the truth-telling equilibrium is
V iT−1(θT−1)=WT−1(θT−1)
Now for any t < T , suppose that there exist transfer schedules {p¯is+1}T−1s=t for each
agent i such that truth-telling consists of a periodic ex post equilibrium from any pe-
riod s = t    T and each agent i’s continuation payoff in the truth-telling equilibrium is
V it (θt)=Wt(θt) for all θt . We need to construct a transfer p¯it :−it ×it−1×At−1×−it−1 →
R for each agent i such that for all at−1, θ−it−1, θ
i
t−1, and r
i
t−1,
−
∑
j =i
uj(at−1 θt−1)= δ
∑
θt∈t
p¯it
(
θ−it  θit−1;at−1 θ−it−1
)
μt(θt |at−1 θt−1)
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and
∑
θt∈t
p¯it
(
θ−it  θit−1;at−1 θ−it−1
)
μt(θt |at−1 θt−1)
≤
∑
θt∈t
p¯it
(
θ−it  rit−1;at−1 θ−it−1
)
μt(θt |at−1 θt−1)
The existence of p¯it again follows from Lemma 1. Since p¯
i
t is independent of θ
i
t , incentive
constraints for truth-telling in periods s = t    T still hold.
By construction, if other agents always report truthfully, then it is optimal for agent i
to report riT−1 = θiT−1. Also note that in period t − 1, agent i’s continuation payoff in the
truth-telling equilibrium is
V it−1(θt−1)=Wt−1(θt−1)
for all signal profiles θt−1.
Finally, inducting on t backward, we have a sequence of transfers {p¯t}Tt=1, where p¯i1 ≡
0 for each i. Therefore, truth-telling consists of a periodic ex post equilibrium under the
efficient dynamic mechanism {a∗t  p¯t}Tt=1. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2 (Infinite horizon). Assume all agents other than i report
their signals truthfully and focus on agent i’s incentive problem. Fix a socially efficient
allocation rule a∗t . By Assumptions 1 and 3, for each i and t, there exists a contingent
transfer pit+1(θ
−i
t+1;at θ−it ) that satisfies
−
∑
j =i
uj(at θt)= δ
∑
θ−it+1∈−it+1
pit+1
(
θ−it+1;at θ−it
)
μ−it+1
(
θ−it+1|at θt
)
for every at and θt . Set pi1 ≡ 0. Furthermore, since for any t ≥ T¯ , the matrix
M−it+1
(
at θ
−i
t
)≡ [μ−it+1(θ−it+1|at θit θ−it )]|−it+1|×|it |
satisfies ∥∥(M−it+1(at θ−it ))+∥∥≤ D¯
we can set the transfer pit+1(θ
−i
t+1;at θ−it ) as
pit+1
(·;at θ−it )= 1δ
(
M−it+1
(
at θ
−i
t
))+u−i(·;at θ−it )
where pit+1(·;at θ−it ) = (pit+1(θ−it+1;at θ−it ))θ−it+1 and u
−i(·;at θ−it ) = (−
∑
j =i uj(at θit
θ−it ))θit are column vectors. It follows that
∥∥pit+1(·;at θ−it )∥∥∞ ≤ 1δ
∥∥(M−it+1(at θ−it ))+∥∥ · ∥∥u−i(·;at θ−it )∥∥∞ ≤ D¯δ
∥∥u−i(·;at θ−it )∥∥∞
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that is,
max
θ−it+1
∣∣pit+1(θ−it+1;at θ−it )∣∣≤ D¯δ maxθit
∣∣∣∣∑
j =i
uj(at θt)
∣∣∣∣
Thus, for any sequence (at θt)t≥1, we have
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
∣∣ui(at θt)−pit(θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1)∣∣
=
T¯∑
t=1
δt−1
∣∣ui(at θt)−pit(θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1)∣∣
+
∞∑
t=T¯
δt
∣∣ui(at+1 θt+1)−pit+1(θ−it+1;at θ−it )∣∣
≤Li +
∞∑
t=T¯
δt
[∣∣ui(at+1 θt+1)∣∣+ D¯
δ
max
θit
∣∣∣∣∑
j =i
uj(at θt)
∣∣∣∣
]
≤Li +max{1 D¯} ·
(
N∑
j=1
max
(at θt)t≥1
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
∣∣uj(at θt)∣∣
)

where Li =max
(at θt )
T¯
t=1
∑T¯
t=1 δt−1|ui(at θt)−pit(θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1)|ui(at θt)−pit(θ−it ;at−1
θ−it−1)| < ∞. Hence, by Assumption 1, agent i’s discounted payoffs under the transfers
pit+1(θ
−i
t+1;at θ−it ) are always well defined. Applying the one-shot deviation principle,
we only need to show that after any public history up to period t, agent i does not benefit
from deviating to rit = θit and ris = θis for s > t.
If agent i reports truthfully in period t, i.e., rit = θit , her continuation payoff is
ui
(
a∗t (θt) θt
)−pit(θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1)
+ δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
[
W (θt+1)−pit+1
(
θ−it+1;a∗t (θt) θ−it
)]
μt+1
(
θt+1|a∗t (θt) θt
)
=W (θt)−pit
(
θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1
)

Suppose agent i deviates to a message rit such that a
∗
t (r
i
t  θ
−i
t ) = a∗t (θt). Then her
continuation payoff remains the same. Thus, deviating to a message rit without changing
the allocation is not profitable.
If agent i deviates to a message rit such that a
∗
t (r
i
t  θ
−i
t )= a′ = a∗t (θt), then her contin-
uation payoff satisfies
ui
(
a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)−pit(θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1)
+ δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
[
W (θt+1)−pit+1
(
θ−it+1;a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θ−it
)]
μt+1
(
θt+1|a∗t
(
rit  θ
−i
t
)
 θt
)
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= ui(a′ θt)−pit(θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1)
+ δ
∑
θt+1∈t+1
[
W (θt+1)−pit+1
(
θ−it+1;a′ θ−it
)]
μt+1
(
θt+1|a′ θt
)
≤W (θt)−pit
(
θ−it ;at−1 θ−it−1
)

where the inequality follows from the definition of a∗t . Thus, deviating to a message rit
that changes the allocation is not profitable either. Therefore, we conclude that truth-
telling consists of a periodic ex post equilibrium. 
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